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jogarmo@unizar.es (J. García).This paper proposes a SCP-ECG security extension after having analyzed the features of this standard, its
security requirements and the current measures implemented by other medical protocols. Our approach
permits SCP-ECG ﬁles to be stored safely and proper access to be granted (or denied) to users for different
purposes: interpretation of the test, consultation, clinical research or teaching. The access privileges are
scaled by means of role-based proﬁles supported by cryptographic elements (ciphering, digital certiﬁ-
cates and digital signatures). These elements are arranged as metadata into a new section which extends
the protocol and protects the remaining sections. The application built to implement this approach has
been extensively tested, showing its capacity to authenticate users and to protect the integrity of ﬁles
and the privacy of sensitive data, with a low impact on ﬁle size and access time. In addition, this solution
is compatible with any version of the SCP-ECG and can be easily integrated into e-health platforms.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction protection of these tests at the storage point and during transmis-Digital medical tests are one of the pillars for the development
of e-health, a new medical paradigm which enables the implemen-
tation of new ICT-based services (e.g. telemonitoring, ePrescribing)
and the reduction of costs for patients and healthcare systems.
Electrocardiograms (ECGs) have an important place in this model
since these non-invasive and cheap tests are a useful tool for the
detection and diagnosis of heart disease.
Digital ECG ﬁles often include metadata: additional information
such as personal patient data and health status, ECG measures or
the diagnosis. The medical interpretation is based on the waveform
delineation (P waves, T waves, QRS complexes), length and ampli-
tude of intervals (RR interval, QT interval, ST level, etc.), heart rate
and orientation of the electrical axis. Since the normal value range
of these parameters is quite narrow, even minor modiﬁcations in a
small part of the record can affect the cardiologist’s diagnosis. Be-
sides, personal data must be treated with special care since it iden-
tiﬁes the patient and his/her medical condition. Consequently, thell rights reserved.
le data encryption standard;
nd node authentication; CRC,
ard; DICOM, digital imaging
ture; DSA, digital signature
lgorithm; ECG, electrocardio-
t; MFER, medical waveform
access control; SAR, secure
otocol for computer-assisted
, transport layer security.
anco@unizar.es (Á.Alesanco),sion is required by several governmental regulations (e.g. the HI-
PAA [1], the PIPEDA [2], the LOPD [3], the Digital Signature Laws
in several countries, etc.). Two general requisites must be
guaranteed:
 Reliability, which implies:
– authentication of ECG tests and users;
– integrity, the ECG record and its associated data has to be
genuine and complete.
 Privacy, to protect the patient’s data. This sensitive information
can only be shared under the principles of:
– Purpose binding, personal and medical data obtained for one
purpose (e.g. diagnosis) should not be used for another pur-
pose without the patient’s informed consent. In the e-health
context, since medical tests contain data which are poten-
tially beneﬁcial for different purposes (e.g. research, teach-
ing), the acquiring entity should urge the patient to accept
its disclosure after an adequate de-identiﬁcation.
– Necessity of data collection and processing, the collection and
processing of health data shall only be allowed if it is neces-
sary for tasks falling within the responsibility of the user
(e.g. the expert who interprets the test shall be allowed to
edit the diagnosis, but the rest of clinicians caring for the
patient shall only be allowed to read the test).
– Transparency, patients should have the opportunity of con-
sulting who has accessed their data and for what purpose.
These security requirements should be resolved from the
technical viewpoint through standardization. Nowadays there are
several protocols for the storage and exchange of ECGs, the most
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puter-Assisted Electrocardiography (SCP-ECG [4], ISO standard),
the Health Level Seven (HL7 aECG [5], American standard ANSI),
the Medical waveform description Format Encoding Rules (MFER
[6], Japanese standard) and the Digital Imaging and Communication
inMedicine (DICOM Supplement 30 [7], American standard NEMA).
An extensive review of ECG standards can be found in [8]. While
these standards specialize in different use cases (diagnostic exam-
inations, home care, emergency care, etc.) and use different storage
formats (binary encoded, XML-based [9]), they all face the same
security issues. Security standardization has been promoted by pro-
tocols such as DICOM, which dedicates itsWorking Group 14 to this
issue, and HL7, which has its Security Working Group; organiza-
tions such as Integrating The Healthcare (IHE); and joint commit-
tees such as JIRA/NEMA/COCIR. As a result, DICOM has issued
many supplements (31, 41, 51, 55, 86, 95, 142)which, togetherwith
Part 15 of the protocol [10], cover security based on different secure
proﬁles regarding: use, transport, digital signature and online med-
ia storage (among others). HL7 has also published several docu-
ments about security, notably its Secure Transactions Standard
[11], Security Risk Assessment Cookbook [12] and Role-Based Ac-
cess Control [13]. The MFER does not directly address security,
but neither does it include patient data except by means of HL7.
It can thus beneﬁt from HL7 security policies/recommendations.
Although the SCP-ECG is a popular protocol, supported by
around 70% of the major manufacturers of ECG devices and re-
cently approved as an international standard (ISO/IEEE 11073–
91064:200), it gives little consideration to data security or privacy.
SCP-ECG ﬁles must be adequately protected to avoid data leaking
and malicious manipulation, which could result in patients’ embar-
rassment, wrong diagnosis and legal actions against hospitals. The
aim of this work is to approach this issue and present a solution in
line with the security policies of the major medical protocols, HL7
and DICOM. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
analyzes the SCP-ECG and its security requirements, Section 3
introduces the security approach, Section 4 speciﬁes how it is ﬁtted
into the standard and Section 5 evaluates the implementation. Fi-
nally, the results are discussed in Section 6.2. Materials and methods
The SCP-ECG is a widespread medical protocol whose security
extension must be designed carefully. In the ﬁrst place the main
aspects of this standard must be analyzed in detail (Sections 2.1,
2.2, 2.3, and 2.4), since the extension must be in harmony with
the scope of the protocol, maintain its structure, protect
adequately and be able to retrieve its exact contents, not change
substantially its ﬁle sizes and associated delays and allow interop-
erability with existing devices and software.
Secondly the measures adopted by other major medical proto-
cols to enforce reliability and privacy must be surveyed (Sec-
tion 2.5). Third, and the main aim of this section, the security
measures that the SCP-ECG shall implement must be accurately
established. These are the previous steps to develop an adequate
protection policy for the SCP-ECG, which will lead to its security
extension. To carry out these tasks the former experience of the
authors with medical protocols [14,15,8] and ECG signals [16]
and the opinion of three independent cardiologists have been used.2.1. SCP-ECG scope
With the spread of digital electrocardiography, the SCP-ECG
was created in the early 90s to allow the storage of ECGs and the
interchange between medical ECG devices (carts) and ECG user
systems. It was initially supported by the European Committeefor Standardization (CEN) to achieve interoperability among most
medical ECG equipment. Now it is integrated in the ISO/IEEE
11073 family and the goal is more ambitious: to interoperate with
other medical devices as well. Nevertheless, harmonization is
needed to coordinate both standards [15].
The SCP-ECG deﬁnes a binary encoded format of data and mech-
anisms for the compression of the ECG signal in order to reduce the
ﬁnal size of the ECG ﬁle. This permits the transmission of ECGs in
scenarios with low transmission ratios and the saving of disk space
in storage. Although the SCP-ECG was primarily intended for 12-
lead records in short-term tests, it allows different numbers of
leads and it has been successfully adapted to stress tests, Holter
recordings and real-time transmission [17,14].
This standard also supports ECG measurements (i.e. average RR
intervals), ECG feature extraction (i.e. onset/offset of P waves and
QRS complexes), pattern recognition, ECG interpretation (i.e. nor-
mal ECG, left ventricular hypertrophy, left anterior fascicular block,
posterior myocardial infarction) and diagnostic classiﬁcation.
Regarding SCP-ECG compliant software, there are many freely
available programs (see [18]) including viewers, writers, parsers,
format and content checkers. There are also methods for the har-
monization of this ECG standard with others, such as the afore-
mentioned DICOM Waveform Supplement 30 [19], HL7 aECG [20]
and MFER (Part 2.6 of the protocol).
2.2. SCP-ECG structure and data content
The SCP-ECG is divided into 12 different sections, deﬁned by its
own encoding rules and preceded by a common header (see Fig. 1).
Regarding their contents, ﬁve different groupsmay be distinguished:
 Section 0: this stores the pointers to the start of the remaining
sections in the record. This section does not contain any infor-
mation itself, so it is considered as public.
 A, Section 1 – tags 0–3, 5, 14–26, 31: these ﬁelds contain the
identiﬁcation of the patient and the physician/s, institution/s
and device/s involved in the acquisition, analysis and diagnosis
of the ECG. These data must be considered as highly conﬁdential
since they can identify the patient (directly or indirectly) in a
ﬁle full of health data.
 B, Section 1 – tags 4, 6–13, 27–30, 32–35, 255: these contain
general information about the patient (e.g. age, weight, height),
his/her health condition (e.g. medical history, drugs) and data
for the correct interpretation of the ECG (type of ﬁltering
applied). This part (together with parts C and D) may be used
to ﬁnd correlations between medical condition of large groups
of patients and the more likely causes/risk factors for a variety
of heart diseases. In terms of privacy, these data itself do not
identify the patient.
 C, Sections 2–6: these identify the leads which are present in the
record (Section 3) and store the ECG signal data (Section 6), which
may be kept as uncompressed raw data or alternatively com-
pressed by different methods. The compression ratio which
can be achieved ranges from less than 2–4:1, when only using
Huffman tables (Section 2), or up to 6–20:1 when combining
second-order differences (using Sections 4 and 5) with Huffman
encoding and downsampling, at the cost of lower signal quality.
In the absence of patient identiﬁcation, (A), this information
cannot be used against the patient: even if it is used for biomet-
ric identiﬁcation, another ECG from the same patient must be
known previously, so no new information is obtained.
 D, Sections 7–11: these sections can be optionally added to
include:
1. global measurements (Section 7) and measurements from
each lead independently (Section 10), to help the physi-
cian’s work;
Fig. 1. SCP-ECG standard overview. Mandatory parts A and C, and optional parts [B] and [D] deﬁned in Section 2.2 are highlighted.
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which must be consistent with the manufacturer interpre-
tive statements (Section 9) and the universal ECG interpre-
tive statement codes and coding rules (Section 11);
These data interprets or helps to interpret the ECG of the patient, so
if he/she is identiﬁed (A), this information must be treated with
strict conﬁdentiality.
Sections numbered 12 to 127 and those above 1023 are re-
served for future use. Regarding compliance, the current version
of the protocol (ISO/IEEE 11073–91064:200) deﬁnes only two
categories:
1. Demographics and ECG rhythm data (uncompressed or with
lossless compression).
2. Demographics, ECG rhythm data (uncompressed, with lossless
compression or with high compression) and reference beats.
Parts B and D are optional, hence they will be referenced as [B]
and [D].
2.3. SCP-ECG messaging/transport protocol
Since the standard is intended for the exchange of SCP-ECG ﬁles,
between ECG medical devices (carts) or between carts and user de-
vices (computers, PDAs, smartphones, etc.), it dedicates:
 Annex D to recommending a simple architecture and a set of
control (ID, Status, Done, Advisory) and request messages to
send/receive (a) ECGs (types S, R), (b) ECG lists for speciﬁed
patients (types E, L), or (c) patient lists for speciﬁed names
(types I, P); and
 Annex E to giving a possible solution for low level transport of
data (physical function and data link function layers).
Protecting the communications involving patient data is as
important as protecting the SCP-ECG ﬁles, so this issue must be ad-
dressed in the security policy.
2.4. File size and access delays
The size of SCP-ECG ﬁles is highly concentrated in its part C,
which stores the signal. This protocol supports the storage of raw
signals and the use of simple compression methods, which
depending on the signal length achieve compression rates ranging
from 2–4:1 (lossless compression) to 6–20:1 (lossy compression).
Assuming that the typical signal duration ranges from 10 to 30 sand the acquisition bitrate from 3000 bps (e.g. MIT-BIH Compres-
sion database [21]) to 8000 bps (e.g. T-Wave Alternans Challenge
database [22]), this results in:
 minimum expectable signal size of 3000 bps10 s12ðleadsÞ6ðCRÞ
bits ¼ 7:32 KB;
 maximum expectable signal size of 8000 bps  30 s  12
ðleadsÞ bits ¼ 351:6 KB; and
 typical expectable signal size of 4000 bps10 s12ðleadsÞ2ðCRÞ bits ¼ 29:3 KB.
Regarding the remaining parts, A, composed of up to 19 ﬁelds,
typically takes less than 1 KB since it only contains IDs, names
and free-text short descriptions. Part [B], composed of up to 18
ﬁelds, typically takes less than 0.5 KB since most ﬁelds are de-
scribed with 1–4 bytes and only a few require free-text description.
Part [D], composed of up to 5 sections, is not expected to be larger
than 2 KB, mainly contributed by Section 8 (expected less than
0.35 KB) and Section 11 (expected less than 1.2 KB). Since only four
ﬁelds of part A (2,14,25,26) and part C are mandatory, the mini-
mum expectable ﬁle size is ’ 7:4 : KB. In the opposite case, the
maximum expectable size of a ﬁle is the sum of maximum of each
part, ðAÞ 1 KBþ ðBÞ 0:5 KBþ ðCÞ 351:6 KBþ ðDÞ 2 KB ¼ 355 KB.
In the most typical cases, the expectable size is ’ ðAÞ 0:5 KB þ
ðBÞ 0:25 KBþ ðCÞ 29:3 KBþ ðDÞ 1 KB ¼ 31 KB.
The delays associated to the SCP-ECG may de divided into:
 Collection of information about the patient and the recording
session to complete parts A and [B]. It depends on the means,
a person typing the data can spend several seconds (typ. a min-
ute) on this task, while a proper connection to a patients data-
base speeds up this operation (to typ. 0.2–0.5 s).
 Acquisition of the signal, to be stored in part C. This is equal to
the signal duration, between 10 and 30 s. If the signal is com-
pressed, there is a small additional delay of ’ 50 ms.
 Analysis of the signal to obtain part [D]. It comprises the
obtaining of global measurements and measures from each lead
independently (40–120 ms) and its interpretation by a cardiol-
ogists (P1 min) and sometimes an analyzing device (10–
30 ms).
 Access to the ﬁle contents by using an application. Loading the
data ﬁelds and plotting the signal leads on screen typically takes
less than 50 ms.
Two typical delays can be obtained from these data, (1) the de-
lay to obtain a basic SCP-ECG ﬁle (parts A, [B] and C) is ’ 10 30 s,
and (2) the delay to access the ﬁle and interpret it (using and/or
completing part [D]) is ’ 1 min.
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In order to design an adequate security extension for the SCP-
ECG, it is necessary to analyze the security supplements and rec-
ommendations of the main medical protocols and to understand
the differences between these protocols and the SCP-ECG. This will
lead to an evaluation, from the SCP-ECG perspective, of the appro-
priateness of the security measures driven by HL7 and DICOM:
 Developing risk management frameworks in order to identify,
assess and judge risks in Healthcare IT. These frameworks help
to improve the management of personal health information,
patient safety, trust between organizations and the avoidance
of technology risks.
 Implementing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Several role
types, work proﬁles, tasks, scenarios, steps and permissions
are deﬁned to make this policy work. The beneﬁts of RBAC are
the reduction of administrative costs, the improvement of secu-
rity, the simpliﬁcation of authorization management and the
enhancement of partner interoperability.
 Performing attribute-level encryption (or de-identiﬁcation). The
same ﬁle can be used for different purposes (e.g. teaching ﬁles,
clinical trials, etc.) if different subsets of data are protected in a
different manner (e.g. using different cryptographic keys). Con-
text envelopes are an example of implementation, including:
– Data integrity checks.
– Conﬁdentiality via encryption.
– Access limited to targeted recipients.
– Media Storage Security Proﬁles.
 Integrating Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) pro-
ﬁles. These contribute to access control by limiting network
access. Each proﬁle comprises:
– User authentication, which is local for each node.
– Connection authentication between nodes.
– Audit trails for user accountability.
 Using secure communications channels, which must ensure
data integrity during transit, entity authentication and conﬁ-
dentiality during transit via encryption. This protects against
eavesdropping, masquerading and tampering.
 Developing secure online electronic storage proﬁles, which
allow the status of protocol instances to be tracked and veriﬁed
in those cases where local security policies require the tracking
of the original data set and subsequent copies.
 Embedding Digital Signatures (DS), which
– Ensure data integrity for the life of the ﬁle.
– Identify signatories, with optional timestamps.
– May be included in Digital Signature Proﬁles (Base, Creator
and Authorization RSA Proﬁles).
– May be included in Structured Reports.
These measures ﬁt within the complexity and wide scope of
HL7 and DICOM. Nevertheless, the SCP-ECG is a much more re-
stricted protocol (specialized in ECG records, not attaching media
ﬁles, with easily separable contents, one-to-one low-level commu-
nications and low ﬁle size), so its security extension needs to be ro-
bust but also have the appropriate degree of complexity. Among
the security measures listed above, some turn out:
 Essential: Digital Signatures, secure communications, Role-
Based Access Control, attribute level encryption. These permit
a robust security policy to be developed with moderate
resources.
 Interesting: Audit Trail and Node Authentication, risk assess-
ment policies. These help to reﬁne the basic security policy by
adding smart management of access permissions, detection of
misuse and search for risks in the security scheme. Unnecessary: online electronic storage, the SCP-ECG does not
deﬁne a high-level communications architecture between hosts.
Our focus is on the measures classiﬁed as essential, leaving
hooks for the adoption of ATNA (see Section 3.1). Regarding imple-
mentation, several cryptographic protocols and algorithms are
commonly used by HL7 and DICOM to carry out these tasks:
 Symmetric ciphering: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[23], Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES).
 Identiﬁcation and asymmetric keys management: X509
certiﬁcates.
 Signature: RSA certiﬁcates [24] + hash function RIPEMD-160,
Message Digest (MD)-5, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1 or
SHA-2 family (SHA256, SHA384, SHA512).
 Secure communications: Transport Layer Security (TLS) [25] –
3DES/AES, Integrated Secure Communication Layer (ISCL) –
DES and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).
New algorithms for signature (Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) [26], Electronic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
[27]) and ciphering (Twoﬁsh, Blowﬁsh, RC6) will be added in this
extension to improve security, privacy and compatibility between
systems. The insecure hash function MD-5 will not be included.3. Protection proposal
The protection policy relies on the four essential principles de-
scribed in Section 2.5: deﬁnition of security proﬁles, ciphering and
signing the contents, and securing the communications. This ap-
proach uses cryptography to add a layer of protection to the SCP-
ECG ﬁles, which guarantees that corruption of data can be detected
and that access to the ﬁle is suitably controlled.
The ﬁle is initially divided into four different parts according to
Section 2.2 (A, patient ID; [B], general patient data, health status
and medication; C, ECG signal and [D], ECG measures and interpre-
tation), which may be considered as public or private. Different
kinds of ciphering are applied depending on this distinction (more
complex in the latter case), in order to balance the level of security
and the resources deployed. While the digital signature ensures the
reliability of all the parts, privacy of certain contents may be left
out (after de-identiﬁcation of the patient) for potentially beneﬁcial
purposes (e.g. teaching, research) unless the patient dissents. Since
the communications involving SCP-ECG devices include ECG ﬁles
and personal health information, they will be protected reusing
some of the previously cited security elements.3.1. Using security proﬁles for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Since the ECG ﬁles may be requested for different uses, a RBAC
policy is proposed which preserves the principles of data process-
ing and purpose binding of privacy. Thus the ECG agent (a person, a
program or the acquisition device itself) decides on the privileges
and type of information the user is allowed to access (parts A,
[B], C or [D] -see Section 2.2-) according to his/her proﬁle. Besides,
all granted access to a SCP-ECG ﬁle will be recorded in a ﬁeld of the
agent’s ﬁle, the Secure Access Record (SAR), to uphold the transpar-
ency principle of privacy. Sophisticated ATNA policies (see
Section 2.5) may be deﬁned on top of this (1) to automatize the
security proﬁles administration and prevent situations of overload
and (2) to carry out audit trails, based on the SAR, for the detection
of improper creation, access and modiﬁcation of personal health
information.
The proﬁles proposed here were deﬁned after consultation with
the cardiologists. Each proﬁle is intended for a different use of the
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and access privileges (see Fig. 2):
0. Teaching/research
 Use: to disclose those parts useful for teaching/research ([B],
C and [D]).
 Security: public ciphering for [B], C and [D]; A is replaced by
a template with bogus values.
 Privileges: reading.
1. Examination
 Use: to allow clinicians caring for the patient to read the
whole SCP-ECG.
 Security: private ciphering.
 Privileges: reading.
2. Diagnosis
 Use: to complement the ﬁle with additional data, such as the
delineation of ECG ﬁducial points or the diagnosis of the car-
diologist who interprets the ECG.
 Security: private ciphering.
 Privileges: reading all parts, writing [D] and tags 15, 17, 19
and 20 of part A, which identify the analyzing device, depart-
ment, institution and physician.
3. Storage
 Use: secure storage.
 Security: private ciphering.
 Privileges: making protected exact copies of the ﬁle, with no
permission to interpret, write or modify the plaintext.
The security proﬁles use attribute-level encryption in a manner
similar to that of the Context Envelopes deﬁned by DICOM. The con-
tent of the parts is sealed by means of encryption and the syntax to
make them retrievable to the targeted user (or to all users, accord-
ing to the proﬁle) is placed in a new section (see Section 4). It would
be possible to implement several proﬁles for several users in a sin-Fig. 2. Protected SCP-ECG ﬁle types depending on its proﬁle (see Section 3.1). It shows
correspond to the intended user/s. Section 0, parts A, [B], C and [D] deﬁned in Fig. 1, Secgle ﬁle, but this would lead to too large an increase in the size of the
syntax with respect to the average size of a SCP-ECG ﬁle. Thus, each
protected SCP-ECG ﬁle implements one security proﬁle only.
3.2. Ciphering the contents with attribute-level encryption
Two different ciphering schemes are deﬁned to implement the
attribute (part)-level encryption used by the security proﬁles de-
scribed in Section 3.1:
 Public ciphering for non-conﬁdential parts, whose symmetric
key and Initialization Vector (IV) are obtained from the Digital
Signature (DS, see Section 3.3) of the ﬁle, in order to raise
awareness about this public security element. This ciphering
prevents the use of regular SCP-ECG viewers to display the pub-
lic parts without having checked the reliability of the ﬁle
previously.
 Private ciphering for conﬁdential parts, whose symmetric key is
encrypted with the public key of the intended user and whose
IV is obtained from the DS.
The two existing cryptographic modalities, symmetric and
asymmetric, have been combined to obtain an optimum tradeoff
security-performance. (1) Symmetric cryptography, which oper-
ates very fast, is used to obfuscate the content of the sections. A se-
cret key and an IV are used for ciphering and deciphering, which
provides conﬁdentiality. The symmetric cipher (AES [23], Blowﬁsh,
RC6, Twoﬁsh or 3DES) operates in Output Feedback Mode (OFB)
since it makes cryptanalysis more difﬁcult and it does not require
extra bytes for padding. (2) Asymmetric cryptography, which is
safer and does not need previous key arrangements to start, is used
to protect symmetric keys and hashes, thus achieving conﬁdential-
ity and authentication. It uses a key pair (public key, private key)
for ciphering and deciphering or vice versa.which security element ultimately protect each part and which access privileges
tion 12 deﬁned in Table 1.
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bind integrity with conﬁdentiality and authentication. Fig. 2 illus-
trates which security item protects the symmetric key that ciphers
each SCP-ECG part, depending on the security proﬁle. It is impor-
tant to understand that when some part is protected by:
 the private key of the agent, everyone has access;
 the public key of the agent, only the agent has access;
 the public key of the user, only that user has access.
3.2.1. Resistance to attacks
The security of the proposed ciphering schemes is analyzed:
 Resistance of public ciphering: Man-in-the-middle attacks for
manipulation would not succeed since modifying data automat-
ically invalidates the DS. To succeed in forgery/manipulation, an
attacker would need to ﬁnd out the private key of the agent, cal-
culate a valid DS for the modiﬁed ﬁle, derive from it the new key
and IV and re-cipher. Eavesdropping is not prevented but the
contents protected with public ciphering do not identify the
patient.
 Resistance of private ciphering: To manipulate/forge the ﬁle and
avoid detection, an attacker would need to (1) break the conﬁ-
dentiality and obtain the original plaintext (which requires the
secret symmetric key or the private key of the user), (2) perform
the malicious manipulation, (3) calculate the DS of the modiﬁed
plaintext (which requires the private key of the agent) and (4)
perform the ciphering with the symmetric key and the IV
derived from the new DS. Therefore two different keys need
to be discovered, which makes this attack very unlikely to suc-
ceed. The attack for eavesdropping corresponds to step (1).
In the opinion of the cardiologists consulted, undetected manip-
ulation of tests is the worst attack since it can lead to the most
harmful result: wrong diagnosis. Private ciphering was intended
to protect contents for diagnosis, examination and secure storage,
so it offers very high security against manipulation and high secu-
rity against eavesdropping. Public ciphering was designed to pro-
tect less sensitive contents, for teaching/research, and thus it
only offers (high) security against manipulation.
3.3. Signing the contents
A Digital Signature (DS) is used to support public and private
ciphering (see Section 3.2) and demonstrate the authenticity and
integrity of the SCP-ECG ﬁle. To calculate the DS a safe hash func-
tion (SHA-1, SHA-2, RIPEMD-160 or RIPEMD-256) makes a digest
of the ﬁle content and a public key algorithm (RSA [24], DSA [26]
or ECDSA [27]) encrypts the digest with the private key of the
ECG agent. At the user’s end the DS is veriﬁed obtaining the hash
of the content of the SCP-ECG received and comparing it with the
original hash, decrypted with the public key of the ECG agent (ex-
tracted from his/her digital certiﬁcate). If they match the SCP-ECG
is valid, otherwise it is refused. The processes of signature and ver-
iﬁcation are illustrated in Fig. 3-A.
3.4. Securing the communications
The SCP-ECG describes in Annex D the recommended way to ex-
change SCP-ECG ﬁles and collections of extracted data, using a sim-
ple messaging protocol (see Section 2.3). Both the messages and
the transferred data must be adequately protected since they con-
tain personal health information. Transport Layer Security (TLS
[25]), the most common choice, can only work on top of standard
transport-level protocols (not implemented by the SCP-ECG).
Therefore, it is necessary to deﬁne an extension of themessaging protocol reproducing the steps and the security
measures of TLS:
 entities authentication based on RSA certiﬁcates,
 exchange of master secrets based on RSA,
 data integrity based on a hash function,
 privacy based on a ciphering algorithm.
The messages of identiﬁcation (type ID), which initiate every
exchange sequence in this architecture, will be used to establish
the parameters for secure exchange, implementing the step called
handshake in TLS. One of these parameters is the RSA certiﬁcate,
which can also be reused to protect the SCP-ECG ﬁles. After the
handshake, all the remaining messages and data will be protected
using private ciphering (see Section 3.2), which implements the
four aforementioned measures.4. SCP-ECG extension
The SCP-ECG is a well deﬁned protocol, analyzed in Sections 2.1,
2.2, 2.3, 2.4, which can be extended by deﬁning new sections
(numbers 12–127 and those above 1023, see [28]) or employing
existing free spaces. Since security is not addressed in any existing
section, an entirely new section is proposed. To avoid confusion
with regular ﬁles we call this new format Protected SCP-ECG. The
ﬁles are given the extension .pscp for easy distinction.4.1. Section 12 structure
Like the rest of the SCP-ECG sections, this is divided into two
parts:
 The Section ID Header, which is common to all the sections in
the standard (see Fig. 1) and precedes the Data Part. It is com-
posed of:
– Bytes 1 and 2: 16 bit CRC-CCITT over the entire section
(excluding these two bytes).
– Bytes 3 and 4: Section ID number.
– Bytes 5–8: Section length including the Section ID header (in
bytes).
– Byte 9: Version Number of the Section.
– Byte 10: Version Number of the Protocol.
– Bytes 11–16: Reserved.
 The Data Part (see Table 1), which adopts the structure corre-
sponding to Section 1 to allow the ﬂexible storage of several
ﬁelds of variable length. Each ﬁeld details the options (security
proﬁle, cryptographic algorithms and parameter values) to set
up a Protected SCP-ECG ﬁle. These are described by:
– The corresponding tag: a speciﬁcation byte which indicates
the ﬁeld we refer to. It would be possible to use up to 255
different tags, although only 7 are required.
– The length: a 2-byte speciﬁcation indicating the length of the
ﬁeld value (in bytes). The maximum possible length
described by 2 unsigned bytes is 65535 bytes, but in practice
this value will be much lower.
– The parameter data: the content of the ﬁeld, an element to
provide security. If length ¼¼ 0, the tag is empty.
Finally, it is necessary to add the corresponding pointer in Sec-
tion 0 (see Fig. 1) to address the new section, indicating:
 Section ID number (2 bytes): 12.
 Section Length (4 bytes).
 Index to Section (4 bytes).
Fig. 3. A: procedures for creating and accessing Protected SCP-ECG ﬁles, implemented by the GUI in Fig. 4. B: a scenario of use for the SCP security extension. Regular and
Protected SCP-ECG ﬁles are depicted in detail in Figs. 1 and 2.
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The tags included in Section 12 (see Table 1) enable the security
measures under this extension:
 Role-Based Access control by means of security proﬁles (RBAC,
see Section 3.1). Tag involved:
0. Speciﬁes the professional role of the user, the ECG ﬁle is
protected accordingly.
 Digital signature (DS, see Section 3.3) to check the reliability of
the ECG signal and the rest of the data. Tags involved:
1. Identiﬁes the agent and contains his/her public key (PbKa).
2. Speciﬁes which hash function has been used, taking as
input the whole ﬁle.
3. Stores the DS, resulting from the encryption of the hash
with the public key of the agent.
 Part-level encryption: by means of
– Public ciphering (see Section 3.2), which protects against
forgery and manipulation. Tags involved:
0. Indicates which parts are public (see Section 3.1).
4. Speciﬁes which symmetric ciphering algorithm is used
to distort the content of the public parts.Any user can decipher and retrieve the original information
since the symmetric key and the IV are obtained from the
DS (tag 3), which is public.
– Private ciphering (see Section 3.2), which maintains conﬁ-
dentiality with the patient and protects against forgery
and manipulation. Tags involved:
0. Indicates which parts are private (see Section 3.1).4. Speciﬁes which symmetric ciphering algorithm is used
to distort the content of the private parts.
5. Stores the secret symmetric key, randomly generated
and protected by the public key of the user.
Only the intended user can recover the symmetric key and deci-
pher the conﬁdential parts, for which he/she needs to load his/
her private key from a password protected ﬁle.
 Secure communications (see Section 2.3 and Section 3.4), which
guarantee authentication, integrity and conﬁdentiality of the
transmitted messages and data:
– At the beginning of the session it is necessary to perform a
handshake: the messages to log-on (type ID) of the ECG agent
and the user must include his/her own public RSA certiﬁcate
(tag 1) for authentication, and also specify the hash function
(tag 2) to enable DS and an algorithm for ciphering (tag 4).
After that, the handshake ﬁnishes with the exchange of a
secret key (tag 5, called the master secret in TLS) to cipher
the communications.
– All the remaining messages (types ID, Status, Done, Advisory,
E, I, L, P, R, S) and all data to transmit will be protected using
private ciphering (according to the parameters of the hand-
shake). Thus, they must also attach their DS (tag 3).
 Secure Access Record (SAR, see Section 3.1), which ensures trans-
parency to the patient. Tag involved:
6. Has a double mission: to identify publicly and uniquely the
intended user for security proﬁles 0–2 and to keep an
updated list of all granted accesses for proﬁle 3.
The ECG agent can export this list for patient consultation.
Table 1
Structure and content of the protected SCP-ECG Section 12 data part. See the below-
mentioned reference for further information.
1The length of these ﬁelds is speciﬁed in Table 2.
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We have built a simple graphical user interface (see Fig. 4) to
provide users (clinicians, researchers, hospital system administra-
tors, etc.) with a way to protect their SCP-ECG ﬁles and access them
easily, following the procedures depicted in Fig. 3. It is compatible
with regular SCP-ECG equipment and software (viewers, editors,
parsers). If this extension is adopted ofﬁcially, ECG devices will
be able to provide Protected SCP-ECG ﬁles and SCP-ECG viewers
will be able to show their contents using the software principles
we have already implemented.
All the operations of ciphering, deciphering, writing and check-
ing are carried out by the application. Nevertheless, some interac-
tion is required: With the agent – to protect the ﬁle he/she must (1) set the secu-
rity proﬁle, (2) choose the block cipher and (3) the hash func-
tion, (4) load his/her certiﬁcate, (5) his/her private key and (6)
the user’s certiﬁcate. The set [block cipher ID, hash function
ID, agent’s certiﬁcate and agent’s private key] can be ﬁxed to
save time. We recommend using [AES, SHA2 512, ECDSA] for
proﬁles 0–2, and RSA instead of ECDSA for proﬁle 3.
 With the user – to access the conﬁdential parts in the protected
ﬁle he/she must load his/her private key (not necessary for pro-
ﬁle 0).
Our graphical user interface is openly available at http://source-
forge.net/projects/pscp/, also as an applet for integration in
webpages.
5. Evaluation
Theuse of cryptography to protect the information in the original
SCP-ECG ﬁle severely distorts the ECG waveform and the rest of the
data. We chose randomly 30 SCP-ECG from www.openecg.net and
calculated the normalized cross correlation, corr 2 ½0;1, between
all pairs of metadata and signals from different ﬁles. Related signal
pairs, such as leads from the same patient record, obtained corr val-
ues higher than 0.6 while unrelated signal (and metadata) pairs ob-
tained values close to 0. As expected, the corr values between pairs
of original signals/metadata and their ciphered counterparts were
also close to 0, showing the decorrelation power of ciphering.
On the other hand, the security extension of SCP-ECG ﬁles also
results in a different ﬁle size and access time:
 File size. The addition of Section 12 implies dealing with bigger
ﬁles, which will increase the size of the ﬁle database and the
time used for the transmission. The main factors are the agent’s
certiﬁcate type (tag 1), which also determines the length of the
DS (tag 3), and the user’s certiﬁcate type, which ﬁxes the
encrypted symmetric key length (tag 5). They account for
approximately 95–99% of the section size. The contribution of
the rest of the ﬁelds (hash function ID, block cipher ID, etc.) is
very low, see Table 2.
For proﬁle 3 the number of entries in tag 6 may grow substan-
tially, so we propose limiting this ﬁeld to the last 40 accesses
(1 KB). Notice in Table 1 that tag 5 is not included for proﬁle
0. The section size ranges from 0.66 (proﬁle 0 with agent’s cert
EC 192, -no user’s cert, 1 entry in tag 7-) to 3.83 KB (proﬁle 3
with agent’s cert = user’s cert RSA 4096, 40 accesses in tag 7).
Since the size of a typical SCP-ECG ﬁle is 31 KB, the typical over-
head is within 0:66=31 3:83=31 ’ 2 12%. When taking the
minimum ﬁle size (7.4 KB), the overhead ranges from
0:66=7:4 ’ 9% to 3:83=7:4 ’ 52%. These results show the
importance of choosing ECDSA certiﬁcates to reduce the over-
head without security degradation. Finally, the overhead for
the maximum ﬁle size (355 KB) ranges from 0:66=355 ’ 0:2%
to 3:83=355 ’ 1:1%.
 Protection-access time. This is the average delay introduced by
the operations described in Section 4.2:
– Protection of a SCP-ECG: typically 0.5–1 s.
– Access: typically 0.5–1 s.
– Protection (proﬁles 0–3) from a Protected SCP-ECG (proﬁle
3), see Fig. 3-B): typically 1.5–3 s.
The last procedure takes longer because it implies deciphering and
ciphering again twice (one time to update the secure access record
in the agent’s ﬁle, another to produce the user’s ﬁle). Comparing
the time to generate a SCP-ECG ﬁle ð’ 10 30 sÞ and the delay
to protect it, the latter is only ’ 2–10%. Comparing the delay to
access a protected ﬁle to the time to represent its contents and
interpret it (P1 min), the former only represents 65%.
Fig. 4. SCP-ECG$Protected SCP-ECG graphical user interface. The operations for protection and access, and a scenario of use for this GUI are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Table 2
Typical size (KB) of Section 12 ﬁelds, deﬁned in Table 1.
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executed on an Intel Core 2 CPU E850 at 3.16 GHz running Win-
dows XP.6. Discussion and conclusions
We have designed and built a security extension for the SCP-
ECG, giving priority to robustness and ease of use for clinicians car-
ing for the patient, cardiologists who interpret ECGs, researchers,
teachers and hospital system administrators, who can keep using
their regular SCP-ECG devices, editors and viewers. The intermedi-
ate software developed in this work to protect SCP-ECG ﬁles and
access the protected ﬁles is openly available.
An adequate level of resistance to attacks against the security of
the ﬁles and privacy of the personal data is achieved by means of
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rithms for ciphering, 3 different hash functions and compatibility
with the main public key algorithms (RSA, DSA and ECDSA).
Although unlikely, if any of these functions or algorithms becomes
vulnerable, it is enough to protect the ﬁles by choosing a different
one. Besides, if a ﬁle is corrupted, all the information will be auto-
matically distorted to warn the user and avoid worse conse-
quences. The use of digital signatures for checking authenticity
and integrity and role-based privacy implies that users must have
their own digital certiﬁcates to make the transactions possible. The
certiﬁcates associated with electronic IDs are valid for this pur-
pose. It is worth mentioning that the use of digital certiﬁcates
did not decrease the experience of the consulted cardiologists.
The resources required to perform the protection – access
seems low/moderate: typically 2–12% of overhead with respect
to the size of a regular ﬁle, 2–10% extra delay to protect a newly
generated SCP-ECG ﬁle and 65% extra delay to access it for inter-
pretation. Thus a good level of availability of the test is technically
feasible.
This extension follows the guidelines for security standardiza-
tion, implementing measures already adopted by major medical
protocols: secure communications, role-based access control, attri-
bute level encryption and digital signatures. It also leaves room for
the adoption of Audit Trail and Node Authentication policies and
addresses the need for future revisions during the life cycle of
the protocol.
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